More October
10-13-2016
Posts over the last several years have detailed many aspects of the Battle off Formosa and the subsequent torpedoing of the Canberra (Oct 13), followed by the Houston (Canberra’s replacement in Task group 38.1) being torpedoed not once (first on Oct 14) but twice (then again on Oct 16).
In The End of the Imperial Japanese Navy, Chapter 7, The Battles for Leyte; Phase One, author Masanori Ito writes: . . . enemy air attacks hit Formosa, beginning 12 October, and depleted the strength of the Sixth Base Air Force. These air battles were reported at home as great victories for Japan, but nothing could have been further from the truth. Fukudome’s air strength suffered such losses in these enemy attacks on Formosa that it was rendered useless for the Sho operation. [Operation Sho 1 was designed to counter any enemy attempt to invade the Philippine Islands.]
Of the crippling of the American cruisers in the Philippine Sea off the coast of Formosa, Ito continues in the next chapter: Complications began in mid-October with the attacks on Formosa by Admiral Halsey’s fast carrier striking forces. The air battles off Formosa, according to the reports of surviving Japanese pilots, were a great victory for Japan. The cumulative results of these reports indicated that one dozen capital ships of the enemy had been sunk and another two dozen heavily damaged. On the basis of these reports, it was judged that the enemy would not soon return. In reality, only two enemy cruisers had been damaged, while Japan suffered the loss of 174 planes. These air battles, were, in fact, a great victory for the enemy.
On the basis of these erroneous reports, Admiral Shima’s fleet was ordered out to pursue the fleeing enemy south of Formosa, and to rescue downed pilots. Shima’s ships were selected because of their high speed and mobility. As Shima approached the scene of his intended “mopping-up operation,” however, he was astounded to find two gigantic naval forces, in perfect battle order. [ Ito is describing Halsey’s “Streamlined Bait” mousetrap . . . the Boston and it’s small task unit was “dangled out” as bait to lure the enemy fleet to come within range of the Cripples to finish them off. However, within a hundred miles of the Cripples, he waited for the enemy with two of his four task groups – carrier planes gassed and loaded with bombs; capital ships on General Quarters ready to unload their five and eight inch guns. ] His ships could not last five minutes against such an enemy. Admiral Shima wisely ordered a course reversal for his cruisers and destroyers and, at flank speed of 34 1/2 knots, headed for Amami Shima and comparative safety.